2013年11月30日 星期六

迈克尔·巴克,调节革命在东欧:多头政治和国家民主基金会

Regulating revolutions in Eastern Europe



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“The promotion of ‘low-intensity democracy’ is aimed not only at mitigating the social and political tensions produced by elite-based and undemocratic status quos, but also at suppressing popular and mass aspirations for more thoroughgoing democratisation of social life in the twenty-first century international order. Polyarchy is a structural feature of the emergent global society.” (William I. Robinson, 1996, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 6)
The US-based National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is the central coordinating organisation involved in the global “promotion of democracy” (or rather polyarchy) (For further details see www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=NED). As noted in the preceding article, US “democracy promoters” have recently been implicated in a series of “revolutions” across Eastern Europe, which began in Serbia (see Part 2) and have spread like wildfire through Georgia (2003), the Ukraine (January 2005), and Kyrgyzstan (April 2005). This article examines each of these so called “colored revolutions” in turn to illustrate the substantial role the US has played in promoting polyarchy. The article will then conclude by analysing an example of where a US-backed revolution recently failed.
Georgia’s “Rose revolution”
After widespread calls concerning electoral fraud in the 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections in Georgia, weeks of protests culminated in protestors storming Parliament and forcing the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze. Modeled on the Serbian revolution – and utilising similar tactics to Otpor – the opposition was highly organised and led by the Kmara (Enough) youth movement. Following the removal of Shevardnadze, presidential elections were held (on 4 January 2004), and Mikhail Saakashvili, leader of the united opposition groups, was elected president. This picture of the revolution was painted for most of the world by the media. Behind the scenes though, the US had applied its entire panoply of “democracy promoting” devices to ensure, that the revolution was successful on their terms (these of course, included the NED and USAID). (1) Forbes magazine warmly described the revolution as “the toast of the West” led by a “handsome, American-schooled young leader named Mikhail Saakashvili, supported by an international democracy lobby.” (2)
As in previous “revolutions” overt support to opposition groups was crucially supplemented and strengthened though diplomatic and economic coercion. In July 2003, the Financial Times noted that the US “delivered the most painful blow to Shevardnadze” when his “one-time friend and partner, former US secretary of state James Baker, …told [Shevardnadze] he needed to be far more democratic to be assured of US support.” (3) In 2003 the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended their support for development projects in Georgia (however, once Shevardnadze resigned, both organisations announced their intentions to re-engage with Georgia) and just before the elections on 24 September, the US’s State Department made the surprise announcement that they would be halving their financial aid to Georgia, which had stood at $100 million in 2003. (4)  The resulting financial pressure must have been disastrous for a country heavily reliant on foreign aid, Georgia was the second largest per capita recipient of American aid (after Israel) having received over US$1.8 billion from the US in the past decade. (5)  It also seems likely that the opposition groups had diplomatic help from the American Ambassador for Georgia, Richard Miles. Interestingly, Ambassador Miles had close associations with “democracy promoters” in East Europe, as he had been the Ambassador for Azerbaijan during the 1992 coup, which brought Heydar Aliyev to power and Ambassador in Yugoslavia during the Serbian revolution. (6)
Ukraine’s “Orange revolution”
In January 2005, news of the disputed Ukrainian elections flashed all over the world; President Leonid Kuchma stood accused of tampering with the electoral processes for his preferred candidate Viktor Yanukovich. Electoral fraud was nothing new to the Ukraine, but in the past Kuchma’s authoritarian government had been on friendly terms with transnational elites and predictably stolen elections in 1994 and 1999 were ignored by the international community. In 2004, this appears to have changed. Subsequently, tens of thousands of citizens descended on the streets of Kiev for over a week, demanding new elections for their favored candidate – opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko. Economic conditions may have played an important role in mobilising protestors against Kuchma, with the Ukraine’s Gross Domestic Product in 2000 being a third of its 1990 level value. (7)
What explained the sudden interest of the western media in this contested election? And why, when millions of Yanukovich’s supporters marched throughout the Donetsk region in late November, did the media “miss” them? (8)  It seems the answer to these questions seems to be intimately tied in with the interests of foreign (or more specifically US) “democracy promoters”, who provided the opposition with around US$65 million in the two years running up to the election. (9) Indeed, visual evidence of this aid was apparent at the massive Kiev protests, where food, clothing, medication and local accommodation was provided for free. (10)
As in the previous revolutions, a youth group styled after Otpor, called Pora (a group that formed in December 2002) led the protests. However, while Otpor’s catchy symbolism played upon the image of a clenched fist, Pora’s campaigning literature was not as democratically minded; their posters showed a jackboot crushing a beetle. Pora received most of its international funding indirectly through the Freedom of Choice Coalition – an umbrella organisation for Ukrainian NGOs founded in 1999 – which itself is financed by the international “democracy promoting” community. (11)
Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip revolution”
Kyrgyzstan’s revolution proceeded in March 2005, shortly after the parliamentary elections of 27 February and resulted in the ousting of President Askar Akayev. He had been in power for the past 15 years and the revolution resulted in his temporary replacement with former prime Kurmanbek Bakiyev (leader of the People’s Movement for Kyrgyzstan). At the forefront of the protests that led to Akayev fleeing the country, was the youth movement KelKel – styled after Otpor. In contrast to the other revolutions, the organisation of the protestors in Kyrgyzstan appeared more ad hoc, with no united front provided by opposition parties and this was accompanied by next to no international media coverage. As in previous examples, substantial funds were provided to support democracy in Kyrgyzstan, which in 2003 to 2004 alone came to US$26.5 million (accounting for their small population of five million, this would be the equivalent of spending over US$1.3 billion in the US). (12)  Like the other revolutions, the question arises as to why the revolution happened in 2005 and not earlier; as none of their previous elections had been certified free and fair by international observers. A journalist writing for the Wall Street Journal noted just days before the parliamentary elections that: “It’s surprising that President Akayev is now cast in the role of autocratic incumbent. A physicist untainted by links to the Soviet regime, he became president in 1990 riding a wave of popular support and street demonstrations.” (13)
Indeed, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Akayev was widely considered to be one of the West’s strongest allies in the region and he presided over a government that “followed every neoliberal prescription of the International Monetary Fund and welcomed the establishment of Western NGOs.” (14) This financial support is evident through the US’s heavy investment in civil society, which the American Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Stephen Young, noted to have amounted to US$746 million since 1992. (15) In 1994 Bill Clinton’s Assistant Secretary of State went so far as to refer to Akayev as “a Jeffersonian democrat.” (16) Some estimates suggest, that as many as 8000 NGOs were created in Kyrgyzstan in the 1990s. (17) Although this does not provide evidence for any of the 8000 NGOs being astroturf groups, a study of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan noted that: “Local NGOs receive almost 100 percent of their funds from international actors and can easily become almost 100 percent donor driven. International donors implicitly or explicitly expect local NGOs to administer programmes that do not necessarily match local needs.” (18)
Akayev’s government was clearly favoured by Western interests, but as time passed his political orientation became increasingly autocratic. A transition, which ironically may have been facilitated by generous IMF support. (19) After 9/11 Akayev was still on friendly terms with the US and granted them permission to establish an air base in Kyrgyzstan. However, according to Sustar the rising authoritarianism worried the US (for geo-strategic reasons), who subsequently increased their support of opposition groups. This pushed Akayev closer to Russia and in an attempt to balance Kyrgyzstan’s strategic interests “[h]e allowed the Russians to establish an air base just 70 miles from the US one and refused to allow Washington to base AWACS surveillance aircraft in Kyrgyzstan.” (20) The closing of the Russian air base deal precipitated increasing hostility of the US government towards Akayev and the increased “democracy promoting” efforts in 2003. (21) Thus, while the US removed a thorn from its side by removing Akayev from power, the Tulip revolution did not bring a strongly pro-western candidate into office as had happened in the preceding revolutions. Chaulia suggests that in part, this may have been due to Russia’s more subtle “democracy promoting” efforts. Instead of just promoting their favored candidate, as they did most recently with Yanukovich in the Ukraine, they cultivated “some anti-figures, making it impossible for the US to monopolise the opposition.” (22) Either way, the revolution only succeeded in bringing an alternative elite to power, which fits Robinson’s hypothesis that successfully regulated revolutions promote polyarchy.
A second try for a revolution in Belarus?
One country whose government led by the authoritarian President Alexander Lukashenko has so far resisted the best efforts of the “democracy promoters” is Belarus. In 2000, the US government provided opposition groups with US$24 million and according to US officials even more in 2001 – with money being spread amongst around 300 NGOs. (23) As in other countries where democracy is promoted, US money is not legally allowed to flow directly to political parties, but this rule is easily circumvented. A political analyst for the weekly Belarussian Market newspaper notes that most opposition parties have 10 to 20 NGOs which can apply for foreign aid. (24) In addition, to financial aid, diplomatic aid was also used in an attempt to oust Lukashenko. The skills and knowledge of the US Ambassador in Belarus, Michael Kozak, were of critical importance in organising the opposition. Ambassador Kozak was an old hand at “promoting democracy”, having gained invaluable experience overseeing the “democratic” replacement of the Sandinistas in the 1990 elections, while acting as the US Ambassador in Nicaragua (1990 and 1992). (25) The similarities between the tactics used in Nicaragua and those in Belarus were amply demonstrated by the US Ambassador’s own admission when in a letter to the Times newspaper, he wrote that: “As regards parallels between Nicaragua in 1989-90 and Belarus today, I plead guilty. Our objective and to some degree methodology are the same.” (26) In addition Hans-Georg Wieck, the chief of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, also played an important role in creating a united opposition in the Belarus elections, which took place just ten months after the Serbian revolution. (27) Architects of polyarchy don’t give up easily and so the question remains: how long can a government stand in the way of their carefully designed and financed “democratic” plans?
Michael Barker is a doctoral candidate at Griffith University, Australia. He can be reached at Michael.J.Barker [at] griffith.edu.au
References:
(1) For a list of the other groups involved see Graeme P. Herd, ‘Colorful Revolutions and the CIS: "Manufactured" Versus "Managed" Democracy?’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2005), p. 6.
(2) Matthew Swibel, ‘Reform, caucasus-style; change in Ukraine? A cautionary tale from Georgia’, Forbes Magazine, 10 January 2005, p. 78.
(3) Thomas De Waal, ‘After the fall’, Financial Times, 9 July 2004.
(4) Natalia Antelava, ‘Georgia: Shevardnadze's Dilemma’, Transitions Online, 30 September 2003; Nick Ashwell, ‘World Bank ready to co-operate with Georgia’, WMRC Daily Analysis, 28 November 2003.
(5) Fred Weir, ‘Leader of Georgia's bloodless coup set for election victory’, The Independent (UK), 1 January 2004, p. 9.
(6) Vladimir Radyuhin, ‘US role in Georgia “coup” seen’, The Hindu, 2 December 2003,http://www.hindu.com/2003/12/02/stories/2003120201791400.htm ; Ian Traynor, ‘US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev,’ The Guardian, 26 November 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ukraine/story/0,15569,1360236,00.html
(7) Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (W.W. Norton & Co., 2002), p. 152.
(8) Even when Yanukovich’s protests were acknowledged in the media, his supporters were ‘denigrated as having been “bussed in”’, see John Laughland, ‘The revolution televised’, The Guardian (UK), 27 November 2004,http://www.guardian.co.uk/ukraine/story/0,15569,1360951,00.html
(9) Matt Kelley, ‘US money has helped opposition in Ukraine’, Associated Press, 11 December 2004,http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041211/news_1n11usaid.html
(10) Stephen Mulvey, ‘Behind the scenes at Kiev’s rally’, BBC Online, 28 November 2004,http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4050187.stm (accessed 16 March 2006).
(11) See: http://coalition.org.ua/en/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=29&Itemid=51
(12) Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's Second Chance, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 256.
(13) Philip Shishkin, ‘Ripple effect in Putin's backyard, democracy stirs - with US help’, The Wall Street Journal, 25 February 2005, p. A1.
(14) Lee Sustar, ‘What's driving the uprising? Off the script in Kyrgyzstan’, Counterpunch, 2/3 April 2005,http://www.counterpunch.org/sustar04022005.html
(15) Steven Young, ‘Press Conference by Ambassador Stephen M. Young at AKI Press Fergana Agency’,http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/amb_press_conference.htm
(16) John Laughland, ‘The mythology of people power’, The Guardian, 1 April 2005,http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1449869,00.html
(17) Shishkin, ‘Ripple effect in Putin's backyard, democracy stirs - with US help’.
(18) Fiona B. Adamson, ‘International Democracy Assistance in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: Building Civil Society from the Outside’, in Sarah E. Mendelson & John K. Glenn (eds), The Power and Limits of NGOs. A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasi, (Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 194.
(19) Eric McGlinchey cited in Chaulia, ‘Democratisation, Colour Revolutions and the Role of the NGOs’.
(20) Sustar, ‘What's driving the uprising?’
(21) M. K. Bhadrakumar, ‘Anatomy of a revolution’, The Hindu, 29 March 2005,http://www.thehindu.com/2005/03/29/stories/2005032903891000.htm
(22) Chaulia, ‘Democratisation, Colour Revolutions and the Role of the NGOs’.
(23) Scott Peterson, ‘US spends millions to bolster Belarus opposition’, Christian Science Monitor, 10 September 2001,http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0910/p7s1-woeu.html; Alice Lagnado, ‘US adopts “Contras policy” in communist Belarus’, The Times (UK), 3 September 2001, p. 12.
(24) Paulyuk Bykowski cited in Peterson, ‘US spends millions to bolster Belarus opposition’
(25) For a full examination of the promotion of polyarchy in Nicaragua see: Robinson, A Faustian Bargainhttp://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/robinson/Assets/pdf/faustista.pdf; Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 201-255; Mohan J. Dutta-Bergman, ‘Civil Society and Public Relations: Not So Civil after All’, Journal of Public Relations Research, Vol. 17 (2005), pp. 267-89.
(26) Michael G. Kozak, ‘Belarus and the Balkans’, The Guardian (UK), 25 August 2001,http://www.guardian.co.uk/letters/story/0,,542155,00.html; ‘Earlier in his career, Mr Kozak served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs under Presidents Reagan and Bush, working in Panama, Nicaragua and El Salvador, and was Ambassador to Cuba. While Mr Kozak was serving in Nicaragua, Mr Reagan famously compared the Contras to the French Resistance fighters’ (Lagnado, ‘US adopts “Contras policy” in communist Belarus’, p. 12.).
(27) Peterson, ‘US spends millions to bolster Belarus opposition’.

维权、微博与围观:维权运动的线上与线下

滕 彪
Abstract:维权运动在中国的兴起与互联网在中国的快速发展是相伴随的。在法庭之内和法庭之外的各种维权样式是随着中国意识形态、政治法律制度和社会结构的变迁而产生和发展的,而以微博等社交媒体为代表的互联网技术极大地丰富了维权运动的活动样式、增强了活动人士的动员能力、加速了公民维权的组织化进程,从而深刻地影响了中国正在发生的政治转型。
关键词:维权运动    社会运动Web2.0    社交媒体    公民社会
Abstract: The rise of China’s rights defence movement has occurred in tandem with the rapid development of the Internet in China. Various forms of rights defence inside and outside the courtroom have emerged and developed alongside changes to China’s ideological, political, and legal systems and social structure. Similarly, Internet technology such as microblogs and other social media are enriching the modalities of activity in the rights defence movement, enhancing the mobilisation capacity of activists, and accelerating the systematisation of popular rights defence, profoundly affecting China’s ongoing political transformation.
Keywords: weiquan, rights defence movement, social movement web 2.0, social media, civil society.

中国公民维权运动受到瞩目,时间并不长,但对维权运动的背景、意义、策略的分析,以及维权人物和维权个案的分析,已经涌现越来越多的文献。本文主要分析维权运动中的法律人群体如何利用互联网、尤其是微博等社交媒体开展各类维权活动,及互联网对维权运动可能产生的影响。
一、维权运动的兴起及其社会条件
2003年一般被视作公民维权运动标志性的一年,从蒋彦永披露SARS真相 、孙志刚事件、孙大午事件 、李思怡事件 ,到不锈钢老鼠事件 、杜导斌事件 、独立候选人参加基层人大选举等,律师、学者、记者和异议人士,广泛参与了这些公共事件,引起了很大的社会影响。2003年底,有学者称中国的“新民权行动年” 或“公民权利年”从这一年开始发轫。 不久之后,“维权运动”一词更多地取代“民权行动”或“民权运动”,尤其海外媒体和一些中国观察家,对此多有关注和梳理。具有标志性的事件之一是2005年底《亚洲周刊》将14位“中国维权律师”作为一个群体评为当年“风云人物”。
维权运动和异议运动、民主运动则有交叉、有联系。何清涟认为,维权运动主要是要求私权利,而民主运动则要求公权力。  胡平比较了两者的不同,并得出结论说“维权活动越来越从自发走向自觉。在今天的中国,维权活动已经和民运越来越接近,它们共同构成了推动政治改革的伟大力量。”  互联网使得各类知识分子、活跃人士的沟通极为频繁和便捷,维权人士和民主人士的身份逐渐混同交叉,各方的重叠共识在逐步扩大,共同参与的活动越来越多,维权运动与民运虽然侧重点不同,但已出现相互支持、合作、合流的趋势。
中国的维权运动兴起的社会条件主要有:
(a)法律体系和法律职业的发展。文革结束之后,中国法律体系艰难恢复,尤其《行政诉讼法》的出台(1989年)、《刑事诉讼法》的出台与完善(1979、1997年)、律师制度的恢复,《法官法》(1995年)、《检察官法》(1995年)、《律师法》(1996年)的出台以及全国统一司法考试的实行,这样就有了捍卫民权的法律以及诉讼渠道,有了法律职业共同体的雏形。于此同时,传统的意识形态话语(“阶级斗争”、“文化大革命”)不得不抛弃,当局转向了新的意识形态话语策略,比如“改革开放”、“依法治国”、“三个代表”、“和谐社会”等。尤其是“依法治国”的提出和“人权”入宪,使民间有了“假戏真唱”的可能性。法治话语和法律规则给维权活动带来空间。影响颇大的2003年的孙志刚事件,就是利用官方话语系统和法律体系进行公民行动的经典案例。
(b)传统媒体和新媒体的空间。传统媒体虽然被严格控制, 但并非没有任何空间。媒体既面临官方意识形态的压力和言论审查的压力,同时也面临市场的压力。因此在某些热点维权事件上,传统媒体(有社会责任感的记者)往往可以采用一些策略让事件见诸报端。 而网络媒体的产生,大大改变了官方垄断媒体的局面,改变了中国的话语生态,甚至改变了媒介本身的概念,因此也必将极大地影响中国的维权运动和政治体制转型。
(c)市场经济的发展扩大民间活动的空间。社会运动需要可自由支配的时间和金钱(discretionary time and money),资源动员理论(resource mobilization)强调这一点。 虽然中国的经济飞速发展中有很多问题,比如贫苦悬殊、官商勾结、环境破坏等,但不能否认绝大多数普通中国人的生活水平在提高,这就给维权活动提供了经济基础。
(d)自由主义思想的传播和民权意识的增长。“在90年代后半期,中国知识界的一大动向,是一批学者重提自由主义的话题,欲图通过对于自由主义的反思、研究、倡导,丰富实现现代化和达致宪政民主的思想学理资源。”  出版界涌现了大量的自由主义著作和译著,知识界对自由主义思想的传播表现了极大的兴趣。而“自由主义理论在走进国人的大脑之后,必然要走进国人的生活。” 与此相应,民众的权利意识和法治意识在增长。这是维权运动的思想观念基础。而经济发展过程中带来的“相对剥夺感”的提高(progressive relative deprivation),也是维权运动的社会心理条件。
(e)民主运动人士的努力。1989之后的几年内参与争取民主运动的学生和市民受到严厉镇压,整个社会弥漫肃杀和恐怖的气氛。但抗议和争取民主的努力一直没有放弃。天安门母亲运动 、公开信运动 、组党活动、地下刊物等,民间的异议运动持续不断,积累了道义资源,也在一定程度上撑大了民间活动的空间,因此和维权运动的出现有着承接的关系。
二、中国互联网的发展
在中国,维权运动的兴起与互联网的发展是共同演进、相互影响的。  1994年,中国正式接入国际互联网,1996年底,互联网用户达20万。到了标志着维权运动登上舞台的2003年,在互联网的发展史上则被称为“网络舆论年”,中国网民看到了自己通过网络改变事件进程的力量。 2003年底的数字是:中国网民数达到了7950万,上网计算机达到3089万台,“.CN”下注册的网站为59.6 万。网民人数在2004年底、2006年底、2008年底、2010年底分别达到9400万、1.37亿、2.98亿、4.57亿。截至2012年底,中国网民规模达到5.64亿,互联网普及率达42.1%。手机网民规模达到4.2亿,网民中使用手机上网的用户占74.5%。91.7%的网民在家中上网。即时通信用户人数达到 4.68 亿。社交网站用户数 2.75 亿。网民人均上网时间每周20.5小时。中国网页数量为1227亿个。
2004年产生的“Web 2.0”概念也很快传到中国,其特点是:用户分享、信息聚合、以兴趣点来聚集社群、用户间的交互性。这使得互联网用户不但是网站内容的浏览者,也是网站内容的创造者。Web2.0产品如skype、twitter、Wiki、facebook、、youtube、flickr、QQ、MSN、人人网、微博等等。 由于这种Web 2.0的网络交互性、信息的快速传播性、透明性,同时借助网络手机等发展,极大地方便了社会运动的组织,从而在全世界的范围内大大改变了社会运动的面貌,并成为推动民主的一种有效的工具。
2006年3月,Twitter的横空出世把世人引入了一个叫“微博”的世界。Twitter也成为国内企业效仿的对象,2007年5月建立的饭否网,开启了中国的微博时代。随后不久,叽歪网、做啥网、腾讯滔滔相继上线。2009年后,嘀咕网、即时客、Fexion网、9911微博客、同学网、Follow5等一大批微博网站上线。2009年8月,新浪微博上线,并迅速成长为中国最具影响力的微博。之后,综合门户网站微博(网易微博、腾讯微博、搜狐微博分别于2010年1月、3月、4月上线)、垂直门户微博、新闻网站微博、电子商务微博、SNS微博、独立微博客网站纷纷成立,中国真正进入微博时代。
Twitter的技术特点,使中国政府无法直接删除发布在twitter上的信息,这样它在突发热点事件、敏感事件上能够发挥巨大的作用,自然吸引了大量的维权人士、公民记者、独立作家和思想开放的网民。2009年乌鲁木齐市发生“七五”骚乱事件的次日,twitter被封锁。(2009年7月7日,facebook被封锁。)虽然被封锁,但还有中国用户通过各种手段来登录与使用Twitter,如修改Hosts文件,使用twip,tweetr等搭建twitter API proxy,或使用Dabr、推特中文圈等第三方站点或软件,或者使用自由门(freegate)、无界浏览(ultrasurf)、VPN等等方式“翻墙”(即突破GFW封锁)使用twitter。 目前中国使用twitter的活跃用户虽然总数不多,但大多数活跃的的维权律师、公民记者等掌握一定话语权的活动人士仍在使用twitter。有人在twitter鼓励人们去注册和使用国内微博,因为那里人数更多,同时也有twitter用户在国内上宣传翻墙和twitter,因为这样才能看到大量被封锁的消息。
国内微博和手机用户的发展是非常迅速的。以腾讯微博和新浪微博为例,至2012年年底,腾讯微博注册账户数已达到5.4亿,日均活跃用户数超1亿。 新浪微博注册用户数已超过5亿,日活跃用户数达到4620万。  截至2013年1月底,中国手机用户11.2亿户,3G用户达到2.46亿户。 至2012年底,手机微博用户数量增至 2.02 亿,微博在手机网民中的使用率达48.2%。 “微博与手机相结合,是对互联网交互行为的一种延伸,网民由此可以保持移动在线状态。更重要的是,微博用户可以借助手机媒体成为即时的报道者,对正在发生的事情进行间接而快速的报道。”
三 个案维权:在法庭与互联网之间
维权律师的典型工作就是代理案件。因此对法律的熟悉、对证据的调查、对当事人权利的争取,就成了维权工作的基础。但如果仅限于此,就不会有维权运动。中国司法制度最大的问题是司法不独立,对公安、检察院、法院的违法行为缺乏有效的监督,在几乎所有的人权案件里,“审者不判、判者不审”,庭审成了走过场,决定案件的力量在法庭之外。由于中国后极权体制中的中央-地方关系,由于维稳体制下地方官员希望“少出乱子”,  由于舆论的力量在某种程度上会成为处理危机或敏感案件的考虑因素,因此在相当一些案件里,维权人士希望通过媒体报道来影响司法结果。  在中国司法不独立和新闻不独立的背景下,司法与民意的关系呈现非常复杂的关联。在一些热点案件中,维权者通过网络施加舆论压力,加大了司法不公正的成本。没有网络民意的监督和不断地争取,某些案件将被司法构陷、司法专横和司法猫腻所取代。在对具体个案的关注中,在公开信、签名与网络回帖中,在律师、记者与知识分子的维权行动中,逐渐形成了具有法律意识和公共精神的公众。  刘晓波先生认为,非暴力维权运动“致力于在日常生活中践行自由,通过生活细节上的思想启蒙、言论表达和维权行动,特别是通过一个个维权个案的持续累计,来积累民间的道义资源、组织资源和博弈经验。”
实习律师王道刚因为三千元律师费的问题被抓捕。2012年3月,程海律师在微博上公布了该案起诉书和辩护词,控方知道以后,也在网上公布了有关“事实依据”和“法律依据”。一些律师研究后认为,王不构成犯罪,仅属于律师违规执业问题,不排除具有职业报复的意图。于是刘洋律师牵头,在网上发布《请求海淀区人民法院宣布实习律师王道刚无罪的紧急呼吁书》,之后有118名律师联署。不久检察院撤诉。  从这一案例可以看出,网络上对某案件进行公开讨论并形成应对官方的压力之后,官方往往要进行某种回应,在一些案件里也会做出某种妥协。
孙志刚事件之后,一些热点案件中,都是因为网络的关注而改变了既定的结果。比如孙大午案、邓玉娇案 、崔英杰案 、许霆案 、重庆钉子户事件 、李庄案(第二季) 、郭宝峰案、广州五君子举牌案 、吴英案 等等,几乎可以肯定地说,如果没有网络的关注,这些当事人的命运一定会发生变化。正是在这些案件的维权过程中,涌现了一些活跃的、有号召力的人权律师,涌现了很多优秀的草根维权人士和公民记者,而且在与民众的互动过程中,维权者之间不断联络、磨合、形成非正式的圈子,并推动维权运动的组织化程度。值得关注的“律师团”现象就是在这种背景下出现的,显然。互联网、尤其是社交媒体的发展大大促进了律师抱团的产生。
蔡卓华案 、东阳画水案、三班仆人案、太石村案 、陈光诚案、王博案(法轮功信仰自由案)、三聚氰胺奶粉事件,都是很多律师集体作战。2007年初成立了基督徒维权律师团。到了微博成为重要的联络媒介之后,律师之间的沟通、合作、形成集体行动,更为便捷、成本更低。国内的《南风窗》杂志敏锐地觉察到了律师团的可能带来的社会意义,称2011年为律师集体行动年。“如果说李庄案律师团和北海案律师团还有职业共同体自救的性质,那么随后的苏州‘常熟六青年案’律师团和贵州‘黎庆洪涉黑案’律师团则显示了律师团公益援助模式向其他案件领域延伸的趋势。”  以贵州黎庆洪涉黑案为例,前后介入律师多达上百名,相当一部分是在微博上非常有影响的著名律师。律师们通过微博发布案件信息,质疑控方和法官的程序违法,揭露当事人受酷刑的情况,揭露当事人受到威胁被迫辞退律师的情况,联名写公开信,并号召其他律师介入。除了辩护律师之外,还有其他律师和学者前去旁听或调查或助威,大量网民跟帖、评论、转发,维持了持续的网络热度,可谓盛况空前。
四 围观:在法庭之外的维权运动与互联网
除了介入个案之外,维权人士秉持法治理念,试图在更深层次上推动法治进程。
挑战恶法
维权人士不仅在个案中维护当事人的权利,而且要利用各种形式推动法律制度的变化。孙志刚事件导致了收容遣送制度的废除。2003年杜导斌被逮捕后,国内上百名知识分子和维权人士发起《要求对“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”作出法律解释的呼吁》。法律人集体呼吁废除劳教制度更是出现了好几波声浪,比如2007年11月茅于轼、贺卫方等人联署的《关于启动违宪审查程序、废除劳动教养制度的公民建议书》,发起者多数为法律人。  2007年,在王博案辩护词中,辩护律师公开挑战了惩罚法轮功学员的各项法律和司法解释等。 2010年,杨金柱律师准备发动万名律师签名,建议最高人民法院对《刑法》第306条(“律师伪证罪”)做出司法解释,后来被湖南司法厅叫停。  反计生人士要求废除计划生育政策的活动也所在多有。在2012年全国人大讨论刑事诉讼法草案的过程中,民间尤其关注某些有悖法治精神的条款,很多维权人士呼吁“劝停恶法”。

推动律协直选
中国没有律师行业自治,律师协会几乎完全被司法局操控,现有的各级律师协会基本上成为司法局的傀儡,缺乏民主选举和决策透明。2004年,刘子龙等律师推动罢免深圳市律师协会会长和秘书长 ,这一事件在几年后的北京律师界得到了回声。2008年8月26日,程海、唐吉田等35名北京律师在互联网上发出《顺应历史潮流 实现律协直选——致全体北京律师、市司法局、市律协的呼吁》,呼吁律协直选,并草拟了《北京律师协会选举程序》,征求律师意见。这些律师通过手机短信、邮寄资料、定期开会、去律师事务所实地走访等形式,呼吁其他律师支持,并进行竞选拉票。北京律协随后发布“严正声明”称,“任何人利用手机短信、网络等媒介,采取私自串联的方式,以推动民主选举为幌子,发表煽动性言论,在北京律师中制造谣言,蛊惑人心,试图拉拢不明真相的律师支持所谓‘北京律协直选’都是非法的。” 此声明又引起律师界的反弹。此次推动律协民主的努力,虽然没有成功,但影响很大,具有比较重要的历史意义。 有迹象表明,一些律师(杨慧文、温海波、张立辉、唐吉田、童朝平、江天勇等)在接来下的两年内被吊销执照和不予年检,是北京司法局和北京律协的报复。

激活宪法
2003年5月,贺卫方、萧瀚等5位学者致书全国人大常委会,就孙志刚案及收容遣送制度实施状况提请启动特别调查程序。这试图激活一直沉睡的《宪法》第71条第1款:“全国人民代表大会和全国人民代表大会常务委员会认为必要的时候,可以组织关于特定问题的调查委员会,并且根据调查委员会的报告,作出相应的决议。”此外,依据《政府信息公开条例》,要求政府公开某些信息,这是典型的试图激活现有法律来推动体制变迁的例子。2009年,北京律师杨慧文向北京市政府所有73个下属部门发出信息公开申请,要求公开“公车使用、公款接待、公款出国财政支出具体情况;年财政预算执行情况、部门预算数据、决策过程”等,但只得到两份完整答复。

散步与围观
2007年厦门PX事件是一个具有标志性意义的公共事件,这一事件赋予了“散步”一词全新的含义。之后的一系列公共事件中(福建三网民案、宜黄拆迁事件 、赵连海案 、番禺垃圾焚烧场事件 等),又使“围观”一词脱颖而出。在著名作家鲁迅笔下,围观是灰色甚至贬义的概念。“但微博带动的公民围观,显然重新定义了围观,使它成了积极参与的同义词。微博的到来更是划时代的,围观从此升级到一个历史新高度。”
“公盟”以及许志永博士长期关注访民权利,多次组织围观“黑监狱” 活动,在有些围观行动中,已经成功营救出一些访民。这类围观,利用互联网组织公民志愿者,策略行动方案,同时在微博或twtter上进行网络直播,线上与线下协调行动。  2010年6月16日端午节这天,网友组织“消夏晚会”,声援维权人士倪玉兰,警方将倪玉兰抓到派出所,网民又到派出所门口搭帐篷抗议,遭警方驱赶后,又沿街游行。
福建三网民事件 ,在围观史上写下了浓重的一笔。2010年4月16日,马尾区人民法院开庭时当天,有全国各地数百名网友相约前往声援,并通过twitter直播现场状况。参与围观者人数众多,但保持和平、克制,组织有序,场面感人,并留下一系列文章、纪录片和分析文章,引起了观察家的注意。有论者说,“福州围观事件也决非平地而起、突然产生,事实上这是多年来中国公民社会发育的必然结果。”  “这次的群体围观,既是历年抗争积累而来的高峰,也将继续延续下去,与厦门PX完全不是一回事,具有更加重要的价值与意义。” 一个重要的区别显然是,此次围观的主题是作为宪法权利的言论自由,而不是以自己利益相关的环境问题。

NGO
很多维权活动需要大量日常的、琐碎的工作,需要协调行动、需要更多的人力财力,只有非政府组织(NGO)才能胜任。比如关注艾滋病和公共卫生领域的爱知行研究所、关注精神病强制收容的深圳衡平、关注平等权的益仁平、关注行业垄断、税权以及社会转型研究的传知行、关注人权法治的公盟、关注死刑的北京兴善研究所等。以维权活动为主的NGO,哪怕环保维权、劳工维权和艾滋病人维权,也难以在民政部门注册,只能在工商部门注册,从法律地位上属于公司。有些无法注册、只能以工作网络的方式存在,如民生观察工作室、北京兴善研究所等。还有的即使曾在工商注册也被取缔,如公盟;公盟参与的维权活动范围较广,如访民权利、公益诉讼、推动公民参与基层选举、律师权利、言论自由、毒奶粉等公共卫生事件、推动户籍制度变革、要求教育平等权等等。

独立参选人大代表
根据《中华人民共和国选举法》,中国各级人民代表的直接选举,从形式上,最高只能到区县一级。即使区县人大代表的选举,也基本上被操控,是虚假的民主。但有公民一直尝试独立参与区县人大代表的选举,较有影响的有姚立法、许志永等。  2011是换届之年,微博已经非常具有影响力,很多维权人士、律师、作家、教师等纷纷在微博上公开宣布竞选人大代表,并以微博、博客、演讲、散发传单、走访等方式进行一系列的竞选宣传。因为政府以种种暗箱操作和明摆的违规操作进行打压,最后成功当选的例子极少,但这次参选活动仍然展示了民间的力量,具有一定的历史意义。

罢免运动
2003年4月,福建省福安市下属几个镇的近万名农民,联合签名要求依法罢免福安市市长,这是1949年后第一起公民要求罢免市长的事件,随后,福建省闽侯县和福州市,河北省唐山市、秦皇岛市也分别有数万失去了土地的农民代表发起了罢免当地党政领导的行政职务和他们的人大代表资格的活动。 2005年的太石村事件则影响更大。  熟悉法律的维权精英在几次罢免活动中都扮演了很重要的角色,如李柏光、郭飞雄、唐荆陵、吕邦列、赵岩、俞梅荪等。

撰写手册
维权运动需要不断总结经验、需要提供行动指南、需要提升理论指导实践。有些维权者和机构撰写和编辑了一些实用的手册,比如,姚立法的《2011—2012中国独立候选人竞选须知》、张辉主编的《公民权利手册》、传知行研究所的《公民税权手册》、许志永的《公民维权手册》、魏欢欢、姚立法的《公民参选人大代表指南》、李和平等律师编写的《反酷刑手册》、爱知行研究所撰写的面向艾滋病人、同性恋者等不同群体的一系列指导手册等。

非暴力不合作与公民不服从
“非暴力不合作” 的一个典型例子是2006年唐荆陵等人发起的“八毛钱赎回选票运动”。发起人号召公民通过各种方式公开声明自己不参与选举、拒绝投票,来抵制被操控的伪选举。这与独立参选看似相反,社会意义则殊途同归。  其他不合作行动如,联合声明拒绝收看“中央电视台” 和其他官方媒体 ,公开拒绝订阅官方报纸;拒绝提供服务 ;卸载帮助政府监控信息的软件;师涛案之后拒绝使用yahoo邮箱;公开拒绝进入、或者声明退出党团组织或作协等官方机构等。
公民不服从(civil disobedience)是公民基于良知而以非暴力的方式公开违抗法律、自愿承担违法后果以诉诸民间正义感的行动。公民不服从是否适用于非民主政权,理论家多有质疑。虽然在中国很难找出有影响的、典型的公民不服从行动, 但相似的例子可以举一些。如基督教家庭教会拒绝按照官方要求进行登记,并公开进行户外崇拜活动。  又如杨支柱公开违反计划生育政策而超生的行为。又如北京市民故意违反“春节期间禁止燃放烟花爆竹”的规定。又如李苏滨律师故意驾驶夏利车经过北京长安街以挑战“限制小排量汽车”政策。

除了以上列举的形式以外,还有很多其他的维权形式,如静坐、绝食接力、罢工、街头举牌、公民调查团、立法和政策游说、戏仿短剧、街头行为艺术、创作和演出歌曲、罢网、申请游行示威、送“锦旗”(嘲讽性的)、漫画、涂鸦、民间颁奖、辩论赛、纪录片 、大规模“饭醉”活动 ,等等,另外一些极端的行动方式如自焚、绝食、自残、自囚、自辱等,则因有争议和客观上难度过高,而没有被广泛采用。
五 在线维权运动
互联网一进入中国,民间人士就开始利用互联网来争取权利。1999年创办天网、2000年入狱的黄琦,就依托互联网开展了大量的人权工作。从创办网站、论坛、BBS、博客到twitter、微博,维权者“与时俱进”地学习和运用网络新技术,开始了“技术赋权”(technological empowerment)的中国道路。
Web2.0技术的交互性、开放性、草根性、即时性,开创出了社会运动的新样式。在线社会运动具有多中心、偶发性、跨地域、虚拟主体的地点。任何网络节点、网站、网页都可能成为一场运动的中心。一段网民不经意间发出的信息,或许引发一场网民的集体行动。运动的发起者可以隐藏真实身份。但与此同时,在线社会运动也同时具有计划性、常态性(固定的网络阵地)、地域性,大量的信息也是通过真实身份发出的。  丰富多样的在线维权活动,在广度和深度上都推进了中国维权运动的发展。

网络签名
以往的公开信组织成本很高,而且发布渠道有限,受众范围很小。而互联网时代使得公开签名的组织更方便、成本更低,博客、email、邮件组、skype、qq、MSN、twitter、微博等等,都可用于组织和发布公开信,还有专门的签名网站。营救杜导斌时,出现了几次公开签名,签名者很快就超过了1600。正是在这次事件的签名活动中,“出现了少见的体制内外自由知识份子的合流” 。在甘锦华案中,有300多人签名,其中律师和法律学者占很大比例。吴昌龙冤案,第一批签名有1252人。李旺阳事件之后,涌现了一波又一波签名,并成立了专门的网站收集相关文章、公布签名信息等。  可以预见,针对某个个案或突发事件的网络签名运动,将越来越多。

网络救援
2009年7月16日,Twitter用户郭宝峰(amoiist),因在网络传播冤案信息被马尾警方抓捕,趁警察睡觉时,他在Twitter上发出求救信息。这激发了推友们的义愤与同情。当天上午,就有网友接连转发“郭宝峰,你妈妈喊你回家吃饭”网帖以示抗议。而“你妈妈喊你回家吃饭”正是当天在“百度魔兽吧”爆红的网络流行语。这句话此时与郭宝峰的个人遭遇产生了奇妙的结合。之后郭案的信息也通过Twitter得到及时披露。推友们的线下寄名信片等声援行动随即展开。7月31日郭宝峰获释。   陈光诚事件、艾未未事件、公盟许志永案等,都出现了声势浩大的网络救援活动,大量的文章、照片、帖子、漫画、视频,出现在twitter、微博和facebook上。

“象征运动”
在刘晓波案开庭时,许多网友发起了“黄丝带行动”,在自己的twitter、微博头像上加上一条象征“思念、祈福、平安归来”的黄丝带。前往法庭外声援刘晓波的民众,也有许多人缠起黄丝带,或将黄丝带扎在法庭外的栏杆上。有些事件中,大量的网友把自己的微博和/或QQ和/或twitter头像改成关注对象的头像,如陈光诚、珍珠、李旺阳。长年致力于维权活动的公盟,在网络上号召大家使用统一设计的“公民”标志。此外,像草泥马、河蟹等符号、网友自创文字等,都是网友进行抗议或戏谑或解构所使用的象征。 我称之为“象征运动”,这些标志非常醒目,通过共同的象征标签,使网友可以相互识别同道,促进社会运动参加者的心理认同,形成强大的抗议声势。而且,也便于在线下联络同道和协调行动。

网络报纸
中国政府严格禁止民间办报。但从互联网的角度,民间办报实际上已经没有技术障碍。翟明磊办的壹报(
http://www.1bao.org/)就是其中的典型。此外,网络上也有很多“个性报纸服务”,如Paper.li,它可以聚合并过滤来自Twitter和Facebook等社交网站的新闻,然后把这些内容变成一份网络日报。
快闪行动(flash mob)
一群人透过互联网或手提电话短信相约在指定时间和地点集合,然后一起做出一些特定的动作(如拍掌、叫口号等),又在短时间内迅速消失。这种行为被称为“快闪行动”。  2012年4月有人组织“自由光诚北京快闪活动”,但没有成功。较近的一次网络快闪行动,是网民发起的在微博上声援游明磊的活动,时间是2012年5月10日晚9点,当晚9点前后,各大微博同时出现了大量声援游明磊的帖子。

人肉搜索与名单收集
虽然人肉搜索面临一系列法律和伦理问题,但在一些热点事件中,对作恶者进行人肉搜索、确认其身份,往往得到网民的支持。较近的例子,是陕西安康强制堕胎事件和什邡钼铜项目抗议事件,网民分别搜索出了护士长和打人的胖警察的身份。
艾未末曾于2008年四川大地震后进行遇难学生公民调查,结果确认5212名学生遇难,并把他们的名字放在网上,并在其twitter上每天公布当日冥辰的死难学生名字。2010年,他又发起上海静安区大火遇难者名单调查。在2012年6月的天津蓟县大火事件中,有人通过google协作文档的方式试图质疑政府公布的死亡者名单。也有维权者通过网络技术收集政治犯名单。 此外有专门的网站和twitter账号来收集作恶者名单,专门汇集迫害政治犯良心犯的秘密警察、检察官和法官等作恶者的信息。

除了以上的形式之外,还有网络投票、视频会议、在线讲座、网络刊物等,可以说,对网络社会运动新方法的创造无日无之。需要指出的是,各种在线与线下的维权活动很少单独使用,往往各种方式综合使用。2000年邱庆枫事件,被认为是“中国第一次网上和网下并起的抗议活动”。  2003年李思怡事件,涌现了大量的文章、诗歌、报道等,建立了网络纪念馆,人们通过网络献花、献歌、点烛、上香、祭酒,并由任不寐、温克坚、秦耕参与发起接力绝食运动。  2009年冯正虎争取回国权的斗争,也是物品支持、手机短信、twitter直播,线上线下配合的成功维权实例。  三聚氰胺奶粉事件,有公开信、组织受害者家长会议、在《南方周末》登广告、组建律师团、个案法律援助、媒体和网络动员、在香港提出诉讼、与厂家谈判、街头举标语、学术研讨会等等。  在营救陈光诚的活动中更是采取了极为丰富的运动形式:法庭前抗议、寄信、送奶粉、送文具、探视、燃放烟花、放气球、更换twitter或微博头像、穿“光诚衫”、制作光诚车贴、制作视频、纪录片、民间颁奖活动、给当地有关政府部门打电话抗议并将录音上网、街头行为艺术、拍摄戴墨镜的照片上传网络进行声援、建立专门网站、连署公开信、散发传单、网络征婚等 ,不胜枚举。
维权运动是在线上与线下之间不断交叉、配合的。有时这被称作“立体维权模式”,“国内媒体报道、现场指导、调查分析、法庭诉讼援助、互联网民意凝聚、制度改革建议、国际社会监督(国际媒体和国际关系)七个要素灵活结合。”“是制度化改革运动和非制度化社会运动的结合。”
六、总结
研究社会运动的权威学者Charles Tilly认为,社会运动有三个要素:(1)运动(campaign):不间断和有组织地向目标当局公开提出群体性的诉求伸张;(2)社会运动的斗争手法(repertoire of contention);(3)WUNC展示(“精诚团结”):即参与者和支持者表现出的价值(worthiness)、团结 (unity)、规模(numbers)、奉献(commitment)。 由此来看中国的维权运动,应属正在成形的社会运动。一些研究者正是在社会运动的框架下来描述和分析维权运动,如李凡认为,当代中国的“自由民权运动”有如下特征:要求社会自由和维护权益的明确目标;各地此起彼伏地、持续地提出诉求;不同参与人群的互动和组织化程度不高,但已经出现;表达诉求的方式多样而且仍在不断创新。  这个运动的发展现状,“不具备一个统一的完整的组织中心,而是处在一种分散的自发的、随时产生随时消亡,但是又随时会再产生的状态。从总体上体现了一个连续发展的态势。”
中国的维权运动自有其独特之处:(1)低组织化。维权运动是多中心的、低组织化的。NGO并非主流,活动受到巨大限制。存在一些非正式组织,比如民间活跃人士的定期和非定期聚会,随机组合、随案形成、案后解散的律师团,等等。这主要是由于政治高压下降低风险。(2)多层次的诉求。有个案合法权益的维护,有推动某一法律政策的变革,有捍卫言论自由、信仰自由等宪法权利,也有像零八宪章那样系统的政体变革的要求。而这种对政治变革的呼吁,在维权运动内部仍然存在分歧,维权运动是否应该“政治化?”(3)多层次的行动。有的维权活动温和之极,一篇揭露污染问题的微博,一次小规模的上访,一个研究报告或研讨会。有的则非常激进,如自焚、绝食抗议。在是否应该绝食、是否应该“街头化”是否应该公开为法轮功辩护等问题上,仍存在分歧。
对现有法律空间的“充分利用”,的确可以起到维护个案公正、改善个别条款恶法规的作用,但能够以这种方式使中国变成一个宪政国家吗?以要求政府遵守法律的方式,能够实现公民自由并在自由化之后走向民主化吗?避免组织化,的确可以减少(而不是避免)风险,但没有组织化,维权运动可以成为高水平的、有效的社会运动吗?维权运动能带上“政治问题法律化、法律问题专业化”的锁链而自缚手脚吗?维权可以“挑肥拣瘦”、拒绝接触敏感案件和敏感话题吗?
这些争论,早在2005年高智晟律师为法轮功受迫害事件写公开信的时候,就已经开始。  高智晟律师在2006年的一篇文章里提出了维权运动的“非暴力化、政治化、组织化和街头化”。 这在维权者内部引起了不少分歧。而2012年四川什邡事件、江苏启东事件之后在微博上关于维权组织化的讨论显示,当时的争论至今仍未过时。不过,在网络新技术对维权运动已经产生全方位影响的视角之下,能够有新的发现。
运动的核心是人的活动。交通和通讯水平的提高显然扩大了人的活动范围和交往能力,从而对社会动员和集体行动形成显著影响。一个例子是,上访在1990年代以后之所以成为一个社会问题,某种程度上是由于火车提速和大量高速公路的兴建。  按照麦克卢汉的说法,媒体乃是“人的延伸(extensions of man)” 。互联网对媒介的影响,看看这些新词就可以感受到:自媒体(we media)、公众媒体(public media)、共和媒体(republic media)、社会媒体(social media)、参与性媒体(participatory media)、协同媒体(collaborative media)、共有媒体( media)等。  新媒体甚至已经改变了传统的空间和时间的意义。卡斯特指出,世界正在从“固定的空间”(space of places)转向“流动的空间” (space of flows),流动空间在信息社会里是支配性的空间形式,人的社会功能基本上是在流动空间里组织的。  按照Paul Vivilio的说法,我们说的世界不再是指广袤的空间,而是“基于不断被我们的交通、传输和远程行动(tele-action)所缩短的临时距离。”
在信息时代,一个人可以在身体缺场的情况下成为行动者(如社会运动的参与者),可以提前去做需要在未来某个时间完成的事情,  可以以匿名的方式展示力量,可以在虚拟的空间里影响真实的社会事件。参与行动的成本和风险大大降低了。而“微动力”经过聚合,则可显示不同凡响的力量。“单就个体网民而言,他的每一次点击、回帖、跟帖、转帖,其效果都小得可以忽略;他在这样做时,也未必清楚同类和同伴在哪里。但就是这样看似无力和孤立的行动,一旦快速聚集起来,孤掌就变成了共鸣,小众就扩张为大众,陌生人就组成了声音嘹亮的行动集团。”  这也就是政府对维权运动从未停止打压、但民间行动却越来越活跃的原因。
“组织化”困境似乎成为维权运动的一个瓶颈。但BBS、twitter、skype、Email、Mail list、QQ、QQ群、微博、博客、微博群等,以及网络手机的逐渐普及,信息同步传播、人群即时联系、多方在线互动,大大改观了人与人的交流联合。互联网新技术还具有汇聚同类信息、汇聚同仁的能力,极大地方便了舆论动员和社会动员,也出现了虚拟结社、在线社团等结社形式,在某种程度上打破了“结社禁忌”。“虚拟结社”、“在线社团”、“非正式组织”、“隐性组织”、“临时组织”——无论何种命名,这些“准组织”的存在已经是一个社会事实。有共同关切和共同观点的人在虚拟空间中的不断交流,也使线下面对面的交流、聚会成为顺理成章的事情。公民的自组织能力也只有在这种实践中才能逐渐形成和提高。这就是Clay Shirky所说的“无组织的组织”(organizing without organizations), Sidney Tarrow认为,“事实上,集体行动潜在的核心预期说是正式的社团组织,不如说是存在于它们中心的非正式社会网络和它们之间的非正式联系结构。……非正式关系网与正式的社团相比,不太容易被警察渗透,不太容易引起分裂。这在政府对结社越来越警惕时,具有一定的优势。”
维权抗争的组织化当然是一条光荣的荆棘路。“尽管在当局的严厉控制之下,公开的抗争活动仍处於分散化状态,但通过互联网和现实的人际交流,各种抗争力量能彼此相互联系,在具体的典型性事件中进行集体性的抗争行动。可以认为,已经出现了一个有明确政治诉求的抗争网络,在这个网络中,抗争不再是某个个人或某个群体的事,而会得到网络中其他力量的支援。” 维权运动兴起之前和之后,民间一直没有放弃有组织化抗争的努力,如,中国自由民主党、中国劳动者权益保障同盟、中国民主党等民间组党活动,天安门母亲运动、泛蓝联盟、独立中文笔会、贵州人权研讨会、家庭教会、公盟(新公民运动和同城公民聚餐)等各种形式的民间组织形式和组织活动。而互联网时代的动员和组织,可以实现没有机构、没有章程、没有固定成员、没有领袖、没有事先策划,但仍可协调集体行动和社会运动。 组织(organizing/ organization)的传统概念也逐渐被互联网技术和实践所颠覆。
因此,在某种程度上,互联网打破了传统的诸多二分法:信息发布者vs信息接受者、官方媒体vs民间媒体、国内媒体vs国外媒体、国内vs国外、在场vs不在场、组织vs个人、精英vs草根、公域vs私域、传统运动vs虚拟运动,甚至政治vs非政治、在线vs线下、有权者vs无权者。哈维尔说,说出真相是“无权者的权力”, 那么互联技术也是无权者的权力。互联网成为了“解放的技术”(Liberation Technology)  基于互联网的web2.0社会运动必将逐渐颠覆既有的交往权力结构。
在言论自由、结社自由的政治结构之下,公民社会“先从互联网找到突破口,在互联网扎下根来,实现虚拟世界的自发联合。再以公民集体行动逐步渗透现实,影响现实,推动现实,改变现实。公民集体行动在中国原本是做梦都不能想象的,但借助互联网,借助互联网带动的公共舆论场,它们变成了现实,在中国的公共生活中创造了一个又一个奇迹。”  中国的维权运动在短短的十年里取得了不少的成就,具有路标意义的事件至少有:孙志刚事件、太石村事件、陈光诚事件、厦门PX事件、08宪章、艾未未川震调查、贵州人权论坛、黄琦的六四天网与刘飞跃的民生观察网、邓玉娇案、钱云会事件、李庄案、福建三网民事件、乌坎事件、2011年公民独立参选人大代表、贵阳黎庆洪案、公盟推动教育平等权的运动以及“新公民运动”,等等。
Twitter的主要发明人杰克?多西说,“一个人可以用140个字改变世界。”对于中国政治转型而言,情况当然要困难和复杂很多。一方面,互联网既被维权公民所用,也被威权体制所用,当局拥有强大的经济、技术能力,网络技术为其提供了更便捷更先进的控制手段。“国家利用互联网来增强其合法性,互联网上的社会群体也利用互联网来改变国家政治和政策实践。”  另一方面,仅有鼠标的点击是远远不够的,需要能量更大的线下集体行动。近年来,“围观改变中国”这一简洁的口号成为很多公共知识分子和行动者乐观的期待。互联网已经极大地改造了信息传播、人际互动、社会动员和政治运动的观念和形式,在此背景下,中国维权运动的积极参加者在线上与线下的种种活动,正在改变中国。

独立中文笔会 >> 会员

2013年11月29日 星期五

利比亞:Katiba陷落之日


The day the Katiba fell
Katiba陷落之日

Evan Hill Last Modified: 01 Mar 2011 08:58
原作:Evan Hill (半岛电视台网站制作人)
原作日期:2011年3月1日8点58分(利比亚时间)
原发:半岛电视台
翻译:@ybburg  (榕通社志愿者)

Libya's turning point may have come when protesters overwhelmed a barracks in Benghazi.
反抗军控制了班加西的一座军营,这也许意味着整个利比亚战争的转折。

Katiba陷落之日
Gaddafi's forces lost control of the Katiba after three days of fierce clashes [Evan Hill/Al Jazeera]
负隅顽抗了3天之后,卡扎菲的部队失去了对Katiba的控制

Benghazi, Libya - If Benghazi, Libya's second city, has become the symbolic heart of the revolution in this north African nation, then the battle to overwhelm the military garrison here was the revolt's key turning point.
利比亚·班加西 – 如果说,利比亚第2大城市班加西已经成为了这个北非国家的革命核心,那赢得守军军营一役就是革命者的关键转折。

Over the course of three days, civilians opposed to the 42-year rule of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi managed to outlast and overpower a fortified base guarded by detachments of several Libyan military units, one of them the feared and reportedly highly trained Khamis Brigade - a special forces unit led by Gaddafi's youngest son.
在这3天里,反对穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲上校42年统治的平民们设法自保并成功的攻克了由若干利比亚军分遣队重兵把守的军营,这里甚至包括训练有素的Khamis(哈米斯)旅——卡扎菲小儿子领导的一支特种部队。

In the end, both anti-government protesters and Gaddafi loyalists lost hundreds and many more were wounded, and Gaddafi's forces fled the city.
最终,在反政府抗议者和卡扎菲部队都留下了数百具尸体和更多的伤员之后,卡扎菲部队逃离了这座城市。

Benghazi fell completely into opposition hands and became the seat of the national coalition bent on ending the Gaddafi regime. The once-feared ramparts of Gaddafi's security forces sit smoldering and crumbled, a site for tourists.
班加西已经完全被反对派控制,成为了以结束卡扎菲政权为目的的联盟的大本营。曾经令人谈之色变的卡扎菲安全部队基地如今已是一片悄无声息的废墟,只有游客不时出现在此。

A sudden spark
星火燎原

Inside the destroyed walls of the Katiba - which means battalion or phalanx in Arabic, but is shorthand in Benghazi for the garrison - the roof of a grandstand overlooking a broad concrete parade ground droops low, its supporting columns cracked, its white and green walls - the standard colour of Gaddafi's regime - stained black by fire.
在Katiba残缺不堪的围墙中——Katiba在阿拉伯语中是军营或者方阵的意思(Katiba作为特殊称谓不做翻译,下同。译注),被班加西人作为(卡扎菲安全部队)军营的简称——可以俯瞰其下宽阔的混凝土练兵场的屋顶看台由于立柱的倒塌也已经塌陷了,以卡扎菲政权的标准色涂作白、绿的墙壁也被火熏黑。

A gaping hole in the northern wall of the compound, all twisted metal bars and jagged concrete blocks, marks the spot where protesters first managed to push through under a hail of gunfire. In white spray-paint, someone has written "Martyrs' Square" in Arabic on an unhinged metal gate that hangs off the breach.
北墙上锯齿状的混凝土和金属构件裸露出来的洞口,标记出抗议者们冒着冰雹般的弹雨首先突破的位置。一座金属门上,有人用白色喷漆写了阿拉伯语的“烈士广场”字样。

Though activists were preparing a "day of rage" for February 17 to follow successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, protests actually began in Benghazi on February 15, when hundreds of citizens angry over the arrest of human rights lawyer Fathy Terbil took to the streets.
本来抗议者们计划在2月17日这天发起“愤怒日”活动响应突尼斯和埃及革命的成功。但是实际上在2月15日这天,(当局)对人权律师Fathy Terbil的逮捕激怒了数以百计的市民,愤怒的人群冲上街头,发起了抗议。

Terbil had been representing the families of thousands of inmates who were reportedly slaughtered by the regime at Abu Salim prison in Tripoli in 1996. The sudden demonstrations, which evolved into anti-Gaddafi protests, took some young, politically active Benghazi residents by surprise.
Terbil一直以来都在为发生在1996年的当局对Abu Salim监狱囚犯的大屠杀受害者家庭做代理律师。而这次突然的示威活动最终演变成推翻卡扎菲政权性质的反抗,让很多年轻的班加西政治活跃分子都感到意外。

"We just got talking at school and amongst my peers and friends, and you were asked, 'Are you gonna protest on the 17th,' and people were scared and said, 'If a lot of people come out, then I'll come out,'" said Ahmed Sanalla, a 26-year-old UK resident who has spent the past four years studying medicine at Garyounis University in Benghazi.
“(刚开始)我们只是在学校里的同学朋友间谈论,有人问‘你准备参加17号的抗议活动吗?’人们大多有点害怕的回答‘如果去(抗议)的人多,那我就去’”一位在班加西Garyounis大学学习医学4年的英国留学生Ahmed Sanalla说。

"Once they hit the ground, we joined, and then everyone else came along."
“而当他们一上街,我们就加入了,之后其他所有人都跟了上来。”

That first day, anti-Gaddafi protesters clashed with regime supporters on Jamal Abdel Nasser Street, a main thoroughfare that runs through the centre of town toward the Mediterranean Sea.
在第一天里,反卡扎菲抗议者和支持政府的人群在市中心通向地中海的主干线Jamal Abdel Nasser大街上发生了冲突。

A rock-throwing battle erupted between the two sides. At one point, a teenage boy clamoured up a post bearing a portrait of Gaddafi and tore it down. The crowd reacted with joy.
双方之间爆发了一场投掷石块互相攻击的战斗。一个少年大声要求人们弄一张卡扎菲的肖像画供大家攻击,一度让人们忍俊不禁

Police responded with force. Officers swarmed into the area from the main security headquarters. Armoured trucks fired hot water cannons at the protesters.
警察局动用了武力。安全部队从他们的总部倾巢而出,涌入抗议区域。装甲车向抗议的人群发射高压热水炮。

"That pretty much kicked off the whole thing," Sanalla said.
“这给整件事拉开了序幕,”Sanalla说。

Dozens of deaths
死者无数

On February 16, security forces kept a tight lid on Benghazi. But the next day, the designated "day of rage," a crowd of thousands of people including lawyers and judges gathered in the square outside the city's main courthouse at the water's edge.
2月16日,安全部队将班加西控制得死死的。但是第二天,计划中的“愤怒日”这天,数千名包括律师、法官在内的示威者聚集在滨海的班加西法院广场上。

The rare display of public anger prompted a deadly response from local security forces, who had almost no experience of domestic crowd control. Foreign journalists had yet to reach Benghazi, but witnesses reported that police had quickly opened fire with live ammunition, killing at least six people.
几乎没有处理国内群众抗议事件经验的地方安全部队对这种罕见的群情激愤的情况采取了残酷的高压手段。此时外国记者还未抵达班加西,但据目击者称,警察很快就实弹开火,射杀了至少6人。

Meanwhile, protests sprang up in the cities of Baida and Tobruk, to the east, and the day closed with at least 24 people dead, according to a Human Rights Watch estimate.
与此同时,东部的Baida和Tobruk市也发生了抗议活动。据人权观察组织的估计,当天有至少24人死亡。

Katiba陷落之日

Destroyed and melted vehicles littered the sprawling Katiba compound. [Evan Hill/Al Jazeera]
军营边胡乱遗弃着损坏并烧毁的汽车[Evan Hill/半岛台]

"The security forces' vicious attacks on peaceful demonstrators lay bare the reality of Muammar Gaddafi's brutality when faced with any internal dissent," Sarah Leah Whitson, the group's Middle East and North Africa director, said.
“安全部队对和平示威者的暴行揭示出卡扎菲对国内异议的残酷态度,”(人权观察)集团中东和北非主任Sarah Leah Whitson

Gaddafi had apparently had enough. The following day, a Friday, armed men wearing now infamous yellow construction hard hats flooded into Benghazi's streets.
卡扎菲的耐心显然到了极限。第二天,星期五(主麻日),安全部队全副武装,穿着他们现已声名狼藉的黄色建筑工程帽涌入了班加西街头。

Residents say the thugs were ferried into Benghazi's local airport by Afriqiyah airlines from elsewhere in Libya, or from neighbouring countries to the south, such as Chad and Niger.
当地居民说,那群恶棍是乘坐Afriqiyah航空公司的飞机从利比亚各地和南方邻近的乍得和尼日尔等国抵达班加西机场的。

Though many Libyans descend from sub-Saharan ancestry, making darker skin tones and non-Arab facial features a fairly common sight on the streets, anti-regime protesters were quick to label their attackers "African mercenaries".
尽管许多利比亚当地人遗传了他们南部祖先的外观特征,深肤色的非阿拉伯面孔在街上并不算罕见,反政府抗议者还是很快的把攻击他们的武装势力定义为“非洲雇佣军”。

After mid-day prayers, crowds began a funeral procession bound for a local cemetery to honour Thursday's dead. They marched past the main security headquarters in a neighbourhood called Hawari. As they stood outside, chanting in protest, police opened fire from the roof and atop the walls.
在正午的祷告过后,游行队伍去往当地的一个墓地,为周四的逝者举行葬礼游行。游行队伍经过邻近的Hawari区安全部队总部,就在他们站在(安全部队总部)外面高声抗议的时候,警察从屋顶和围墙上方开枪了。

Benghazi fell into chaos. Photographs and video posted on the Internet by residents shows the men in hard hats rampaging through the city's streets, firing handguns into the air and breaking into homes as terrified onlookers scream in horror from their balconies.
班加西陷入一片混乱。当地居民上传到网上的照片和视频揭示了带安全帽的安全部队发疯般的扫荡了城市街道,他们向天鸣枪着闯入居民的房子,而院子不时传来里吓坏了的人们尖叫声。

Witnesses say the men travelled in unmarked civilian cars and ambulances and fired assault rifles indiscriminately from their windows.
目击者称,安全部队坐着没有车牌的私家车和救护车,从车窗里用冲锋枪漫无目的的扫射。

Army troops stationed in the city made encouraging statements to thousands of protesters who remained camped outside the main courthouse, but security forces stormed the crowd in the predawn hours that night, firing tear gas.
武装部队的进驻让留在法院外露营的数千抗议者更加激动,但是该夜临近黎明时分,安全部队用催泪瓦斯袭击了抗议人群。

Human Rights Watch was forced to update its death toll continually; citing sources in Benghazi's hospitals, the organisation said that 35 people had been killed in the city on Friday alone, most by gunfire.
人权观察被迫不断的更新死亡数字;该组织援引班加西医院的消息称,单单周五这天,该市有35人被杀,基本上都是枪杀。

In a country of only six million people - and a city of roughly 750,000 - where families trace their roots to extensive tribal networks, deaths do not go unnoticed or unrequited.
在一个总人口只有600万的国家-以及这个人口大约75万人的城市-家庭之间依靠广泛的部族网络联系着,死亡是不可能被忽视或不了了之的。

"Once blood was spilled, that was it," Sanalla said.
“血流到了地上,仇恨就再也化解不开了,”Sanalla说。

'Let him die'
让他死

The tide began to turn for the anti-regime forces on Saturday. Despite an Internet shut down and heavy restrictions on mobile phone communications, protesters still managed to mass in Benghazi.
舆论从周六这天开始转向反政府一方。尽管网络被切断、手机通讯管治非常严格,抗议者仍然设法在班加西聚集起来。

They focused their rage on whatever symbols of the regime they could lay their hands on. Courts, police stations, prisons and a museum honouring the Gaddafi-written founding text of modern Libya - the Green Book - were all torched, until only the Katiba and the security building in Hawari remained.
他们的怒火倾泻到他们碰到的一切能代表政府的东西上。法院、警察局、监狱和一个以纪念卡扎菲著的当代利比亚著作-绿宝书-的博物馆都被烧毁了,最后只有军营和位于Hawari的安全部队大楼还在。

Standing on the roof of the destroyed security headquarters on Sunday, Mohammed al-Huni, a young protester, recalled the fight. Between the exterior and interior walls of the "muderiya," or directorate, as the compound is called, the ground was still covered with scores of rocks - the protesters' most common weapon.
周日,站在安全部队总部大楼损毁的屋顶上,年轻的抗议者Mohammed al-Huni回忆了那场战斗。在又被称作“muderiya”的总部工事外墙和内墙之间的地面上,仍旧散落着大量的石块 – 抗议者们最常用的武器。

Facing men armed with rifles, the youth threw stones, converging on the building from the north and west. They used homemade explosives to break through outer gates, but under heavy fire from what witnesses identified as 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns, they withdrew.
面对着拿着步枪全副武装的部队,年轻人从西、北两个方向聚集到工事前面投掷石块。他们用自制炸药冲破了外门,但是在据目击者辨别出的14.5毫米口径的防空机枪扫射面前退却了。

Residents described a "massacre"; doctors in Benghazi said children as young as eight had been killed, and grotesque images of bodies dismembered by high-calibre ammunition emerged from Benghazi hospitals.
居民们描述了一场“大屠杀”景象,班加西的医生说最小的死者只有大约8岁,在班加西医院中,被大口径武器肢解的奇形怪状的尸体比比皆是。

Asim Mahmoud, a 23-year-old student in the Garyounis University college of literature, worked occasionally inside the muderiya taking fingerprints for security forces. On Sunday, perusing the wreckage of rooms once occupied by high-ranking officers, he recounted with al-Huni the day the protesters massed and tried to storm the building.
Asim Mahmoud,一名在Garyounis大学文学院读书的23岁学生,在安全部队总部兼职做指纹记录工作。星期日这天,在一片狼藉的曾经被高级官员占用的房间中,他和al-Huni回忆起抗议者聚集并试图攻击大楼的场景。

Mahmoud's cousin had been shot during a confrontation at the Katiba, and he was infuriated by Gaddafi's arrogant statements that described protesters as drug addicts and terrorists. On the Saturday of the first assault, he hid inside with other security employees.
Mahmoud的堂兄在攻击军营的战斗中被枪杀,他也被卡扎菲傲慢的将抗议者称作瘾君子和恐怖分子的言行激怒。在周六的第一轮对抗中,他和安全部队大楼里的一些其他雇员(在大楼内)躲了起来。

The next day, he changed out of his uniform, slipped out a side door, and ran to join the opposition. Al-Huni and Mahmoud now serve together as members of a civilian team guarding the muderiya from looters or Gaddafi loyalists.
第二天,他换下制服,偷偷溜出侧门,加入了反抗者队伍中。Al-Huni和Mahomud现在加入了市民护卫队,防止小偷和卡扎菲支持者接近原安全部队总部。

Crowds drew close to the Katiba walls and began to hurl stones. Soldiers inside responded with gunfire. The exchanges continued until the soldiers called a truce.
人群靠近军营围墙开始投掷石块,里面的守军开枪还击。战斗一直持续到军人们宣布停火。

They called out to the protesters that they were on the people's side, opened the gates and beckoned the men closer to negotiate. Tawfik Omran, a 30-year-old engineer who was filming the confrontation, said his comrades told him to stay behind as they went forward, so he could document what happened.
他们向示威者大喊他们支持人民,然后打开了大门示意人们靠近谈判。30岁的工程师Tawfik Omran拍摄了这个过程,他说他的同志们让他在其他人前进的时候呆在后面(拍摄),然后他记录下了发生的事。

When the youth approached to within around six metres, the army opened fire again, mowing down the front line of protesters. The men around Omran surged forward, yelling "God is great!" Omran turned to hold back a man who was trying to run ahead. The man fell. Omran tried to pick him up by his coat. Then he noticed the blood pouring out; the man had been shot in the neck.
当那几个年轻人靠近到大约6米的位置时,军队又一次开火了,割草般放倒了前排的示威人群。Omran周围的人们高喊着“真主伟大!”向前冲。Omran想拉住一名想往前冲的男子,他倒地了。Omran想用自己的外套拉他起来,这才发现这名男子的血喷涌而出,他被击中了脖子。

Omran was overwhelmed by advancing soldiers. He pointed to the man, saying he had been severely injured and needed to go to the hospital. The soldiers kicked the man. "Let him die," they said, according to Omran. Then they dragged Omran inside the compound and threw him into an underground prison until he was a later saved by protesters.
Omran被冲过来的军人包围了。他指着伤者说他受了伤,需要被马上送往医院。军人们踢了踢他,说“让他死,”,Omran后来回忆道。然后他们把Omran拖进工事,扔到地下监狱关押了起来,直到后来义军将他救出。

The army switches sides
军队倒戈

On Sunday, the anti-regime forces set out to finish the job. Though the day started quietly, protest crowds began to mass in the afternoon. They equipped themselves with "joulateena" - small, homemade bombs that residents traditionally toss into the sea and detonate to kill a dozen fish at a time.
周日,反政府武装打算结束战斗。尽管开始的很早,抗议人群直到下午才开始集结。他们带着“joulateena”-一种当地传统用于在海里炸鱼的自制炸弹作为武器。

Outside the Katiba, as dusk arrived, men driving commandeered bulldozers and trucks loaded with petrol attempted to ram the walls. Many were shot to death behind their drivers' wheels, their vehicles slowing to a halt in the street. Volunteer ambulance drivers careened through the combat, picking up victims and taking them to nearby hospitals.
夜幕降临之后,军营围墙外的人群开着征用来的装满着汽油的推土机和卡车试图炸开围墙。许多人在驾驶室里就被射杀,车子也减速停在街上。志愿急救车驾驶员冒着枪林弹雨将伤者接上车,送往附近的医院。


At some point in the evening, longtime Gaddafi regime loyalist and special forces commander Abdel Fattah Younes defected to the protesters' side.
夜里,长期以来忠于卡扎菲政权的特种部队指挥官Abdel Fattah Younes向反抗军投降。

Troops from his unit, based on the outskirts of town, arrived at the opposite side of the Katiba armed with machine guns and driving trucks mounted with anti-aircraft guns. Two tanks under Younes's command followed.
他麾下驻扎在郊区的部队开至军营外,给反抗军带来了机枪和武装着防空机枪的卡车,之后两辆Younes的坦克也开至。

Younes's was the highest-profile defection and the most immediately beneficial to the protesters, but government troops had been switching sides for days since the uprising began.
Yones的部队是向义军投诚的最高编制也是最及时有效的武装力量,但并不是最早,政府军从起义开始就不断地向义军投诚。

Zakaria Abdelrahman al-Jihani, 24, left his military post on February 15 to return to Benghazi, his hometown.
24岁的Zakaria Abdelrahman al-Jihani 2月15日离开了他的部队回到了家乡班加西。

Standing guard inside a former regime prison in Benghazi on Friday guarding a stockpile of returned weapons, al-Jihani said he had joined the army in 2004 and become a member of the Thafeda Bashariya, a naval commando unit. Before the uprising, his unit was assigned to guard an important oil installation at Ras Lanuf, several hundred kilometers west of Benghazi, near the Gaddafi stronghold of Sirte.
周五,al-Jihani在现在作为武器库的前政府监狱做看守工作,他说他2004年参军,后来成为了海军突击队组织Thafeda Bashariya的一员。起义之前,他的部队被安排看守Ras Lanuf的重要石油设施,那里离班加西几百公里,靠近卡扎菲的军事要塞Sirte。

As protests broke out, al-Jihani's commanders granted him and others leave to return home.
起义开始后,al-Jihani部队的指挥官允许他和他的同僚们回家。

"The only thing in my mind was getting a weapon," he said. "People were fighting with stones. They started shooting them with anti-aircraft guns."
“我现在能想到的唯一需要就是武器,”他说“人们正在用石块对抗对面的防空机枪”

Al-Jihani and around 70 others, including friends from his unit, visited a nearby base the Friday before the Katiba attack and found it empty; the soldiers there had already joined the people, he said. They took rocket-propelled grenade launchers, AK-47s and anti-aircraft guns.
Al-Jihani和他的朋友、同一部队的战友一共70人左右,Katiba之战之前的周五造访了附近的一个基地,那里已经人去楼空;那里的士兵几乎都已经加入到人民一方,他说。他们带着火箭推进榴弹发射器、AK-47和防空机枪(加入义军)。

On Sunday, armed protesters using strategies similar to their comrades at the Katiba overwhelmed the security headquarters in Hawari and began acquiring more weapons there. The attack on the Katiba intensified, and protesters began breaching its walls and torching the barracks near the exterior.
周日,武装起来的义军用他们在Katiba的同志们类似的方式攻占了Hawari的安全部队总部并获得了更多的武器。对Katiba的攻击得到了加强,义军开始烧毁它的外墙和一些外围建筑。

According to some protesters, Younis, a longtime Benghazi resident, granted safe passage out of the city to loyalist troops escaping the Katiba.
据一些抗议者称,本地居民Younis给Katiba的卡扎菲部队提供了逃出班加西的通道。

As anti-regime forces gained access to the interior of the base, they saw evidence of the troops' divided loyalties. Elements of three units had been stationed there to quell the uprising: The Fadheel brigade, out of Sitre; the Khamis brigade, from Tripoli; and the Tariq brigade, which was based in the southern town of Sabha.
当反政府军进入堡垒内部,他们看到了亲卡扎菲部队的分裂。为了平息起义,三支不同的部队被部署到了这里:来自Sitre要塞的Fadheel旅;来自的黎波里的Khamis旅;以及大本营设在南部城市Sabha的Tariq旅。

Some soldiers in the Fadheel brigade, Omran said, were from Benghazi or had familial connections there and refused to fire on the protesters. A dozen or more of them were shot to death by their fellow soldiers, he said. Protesters would later discover the severely burned bodies of soldiers inside the Katiba, their hands tied behind their backs.
Omran解释道,Fadheel旅的很多士兵要么就是班加西人,要么有亲戚在那里,他们拒绝向抗议者开枪。至少有一打这样的士兵被枪决,他说。抗议者们也许晚些时候能从Katiba里找到一些士兵被烧掉的尸体,他们的手都被绑在身后。

On Sunday night, at around 9:30, the Katiba battle ended. Gaddafi loyalists and mercenaries had been killed or captured, or had melted into the countryside or fled back to Tripoli. Opposition forces had won battle to free Benghazi, now they would have to figure out how to govern.
周日晚间9点30左右,Katiba之战结束了。忠于卡扎菲的部队以及雇佣军有的被杀,有的被俘虏,其余的逃到了城外或者逃回了的黎波里。反对派赢得了解放班加西的战斗,也许他们现在得考虑组建政府的事了。